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1I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents a suitable opportunity for the Court to provide much 
needed guidance on the “principal injuries” element of the “local controversy” 
exception to federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(“CAFA”).  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
At stake is whether a plaintiff may extinguish a defendant’s right to defend 
in federal court a genuinely multistate controversy over disputed nationwide 
business practices simply by pleading the putative class to contain citizens of a 
single state.  
The plaintiff here claims that he suffered an invasion of privacy when the 
defendants recorded phone calls they placed to him as part of a nationwide 
marketing campaign.  California, along with at least eleven other states, prohibits
recording of phone calls without the recipients’ knowledge or consent.
Pleading tactically in hopes of keeping this matter out of federal court, the 
plaintiff asserts only a California state law claim on behalf of a California class.  
Following removal, the Northern District of California remanded the case to 
California Superior Court, finding that plaintiff succeeded in bringing this 
otherwise multistate controversy within CAFA’s local controversy exception by 
limiting class membership to Californians, despite the nationwide scope of the 
telemarketing campaign in dispute and the potential for litigation in other states.
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2The district court’s order raises an unsettled question about a key element of 
CAFA’s local controversy exception:  whether by artful pleading alone a plaintiff 
can transmute a multistate controversy into a superficially “local” one.  By this 
petition, defendant and petitioner TeleTech Services Corporation (“TeleTech”) 
asks the Court to review this important issue, as “CAFA was clearly designed to 
prevent plaintiffs from artificially structuring their suits to avoid federal 
jurisdiction.”  Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 407 (6th 
Cir. 2008).  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant Google, Inc. (“Google”), offers an internet advertising service 
called “AdWords.”  In February 2012, plaintiff David F. Calkins (“Plaintiff”), a 
California citizen, filed his original class action complaint in the Superior Court of 
California against Google, a Delaware corporation headquartered in California.  
Plaintiff alleges that his phone conversations with customer service representatives 
concerning Google’s AdWords service were recorded without his knowledge or 
consent in violation of California Penal Code section 632.  Original complaint, 
doc. 1 (exhibit A).  
Plaintiff later learned that, at relevant times, Google engaged TeleTech to 
conduct the AdWords telemarketing campaign, and that TeleTech’s sister 
company, Revana, Inc. (“Revana”), made the disputed calls to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff 
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3filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”) in state court on October 12, 2012, 
naming TeleTech, a Colorado citizen, as an additional defendant.  FAC, doc. 1 
(exhibit B).  The FAC asserts a single cause of action for violation of section 632
against Google and TeleTech (together, “Defendants”) on behalf of a class defined 
as follows:
All persons in California other than employees of Google 
or TeleTech who, at any time since February 24, 2009, 
spoke on the telephone with a customer service 
representative who called on behalf of Google and were 
not advised by the customer service representative prior 
to the conversation that it was being or might be 
recorded.  Id. at ¶ 11.
The FAC alleges that class members are “entitled under Penal Code section
637.2 to statutory damages of $5,000 for every violation of Penal Code section
632” (FAC, doc. 1 (exhibit B), ¶ 12(b)(4); see id. at ¶ 19), but does not allege the 
total number of violations, nor anything else to establish an amount in controversy 
in excess of CAFA’s $5 million jurisdictional minimum.  
On February 20, 2013, after determining by its own investigation that the 
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, TeleTech filed a notice of removal in 
the Northern District of California.  Notice of removal, doc. 1.  
Plaintiff moved to remand the matter to state court.  Motion for remand, doc. 
18.  After full briefing (docs. 21 and 24), but without hearing oral argument, the 
Northern District granted Plaintiff’s motion to remand and entered the 
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4corresponding order on July 12, 2013.  Order, doc. 30.
In granting remand, the district court ruled that this matter falls within the 
local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction set forth at 28 U.S.C. section
1332(d)(4)(A).  Order, doc. 30, pp. 6-8.  The district court found that Plaintiff met 
his burden to establish that the principal injuries wrought by Defendants’ conduct 
were suffered in California (id. at p. 8), despite TeleTech’s introduction of 
evidence that the Google AdWords telemarketing campaign was nationwide in 
scope.  Declaration of Rebecca Couturier (“Couturier decl.”), doc. 21 (exhibit 3), 
¶ 6 (calls “not limited to California,” but placed “across the nation,” even “into 
other countries”).  
In its order, the district court acknowledged that Defendants’ conduct could 
be actionable under laws “similar to [Penal Code section] 632” in a “handful” of 
other states.  Order, doc. 30, p. 8.  Nonetheless, the court concluded that Plaintiff 
satisfied the principal injuries requirement because “the class definition includes 
only individuals who received calls ‘in California.’”  Id.
TeleTech now files this timely petition for permission to appeal the remand 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1453(c)(1).
III. QUESTION PRESENTED
For purposes of 28 U.S.C. section 1332(d)(4)(A)’s “local controversy” 
exception to CAFA jurisdiction, may a plaintiff seeking remand to state court meet 
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5his burden to establish that the principal injuries were incurred in that state merely 
by pleading a class limited to that state, even when the challenged conduct was 
nationwide in scope and potentially actionable in multiple other states?
IV. RELIEF SOUGHT
By this petition, TeleTech seeks permission to perfect an appeal of the order 
remanding this matter to California Superior Court, entered on July 12, 2013, by 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
V. REASONS THE COURT SHOULD PERMIT THE APPEAL
This Court should exercise its jurisdiction to consider the important question 
of whether putative class plaintiffs may invoke CAFA’s local controversy 
exception in a multistate controversy by limiting class membership to citizens of a 
single state.  
The Court wields discretion to decide this issue under 28 U.S.C section
1453(c)(1), which provides that “a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an 
order of a district court granting or denying a motion to remand…if application is 
made to the court of appeals not more than 10 days after entry of the order.”  This 
“discretion to hear appeals exists in part to develop a body of appellate law 
interpreting CAFA.”  Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 627 F.3d 1096 (9th 
Cir. 2010).   
Case: 13-80166     07/22/2013          ID: 8713935     DktEntry: 1-2     Page: 10 of 36
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is appropriate to hear discretionary CAFA appeals under section 1453(c)(1).  A 
“key factor” is (1) “the presence of an important CAFA-related question in the 
case.”  Coleman, 627 F.3d at 1100.  The Court should also consider (2) “the 
importance of the CAFA-related question to the case at hand”; (3) “the likelihood 
that the question will evade effective review if left for consideration only after final 
judgment”; (4) “whether the record is sufficiently developed and the order 
sufficiently final to permit intelligent review”; and (5) the “familiar inquiry into the 
balance of harms.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Each of these considerations calls for appellate review of the district court’s 
application of CAFA’s local controversy exception in this case.
A. This Case Presents An Important, Unsettled Question About the 
Principal Injuries Element of CAFA’s Local Controversy 
Exception.
As the Court noted in Coleman, 627 F.3d at 1100, a key factor favoring 
appellate review is the presence of an important CAFA-related question, 
particularly when the question is unsettled and “appears to be either incorrectly 
decided [by the court below] or at least fairly debatable.”  Id. (quoting Coll. of 
Dental Surgeons of P.R. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 38-39 (1st Cir. 
2009).
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principal injuries element of CAFA’s local controversy exception:  namely, 
whether a plaintiff can satisfy the principal injuries requirement merely by limiting 
class membership to citizens of a single state, even when the challenged conduct is 
nationwide in scope and potentially actionable in multiple other states.
CAFA’s local controversy exception appears at 28 U.S.C. section
1332(d)(4)(A).  That statute provides that a district court shall decline to exercise 
its CAFA jurisdiction if it finds each of the following:  (1) greater than two-thirds 
of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the 
state in which the action was originally filed; (2) at least one defendant is a 
defendant (a) from whom significant relief is sought, (b) whose alleged conduct 
forms a significant basis for the class claims, and (c) who is a citizen of the state in 
which the action was originally filed; (3) “principal injuries resulting from the 
alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the state 
in which the action was originally filed”; and (4) during the three-year period 
preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action has been filed 
asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on 
behalf of the same or other persons.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
Once CAFA removal jurisdiction has been established, the party seeking 
remand bears the burden of establishing that the local controversy exception 
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8applies, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the 
case.  Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007); Evans v. 
Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).   As this Court has made 
clear, “the local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction is ‘narrow,’” and is 
“intended to ‘identify…a controversy that uniquely affects a particular locality.’”  
Coleman, 627 F.3d at 1100 (quoting Evans, 449 F.3d at 1163-1164.  The principal 
injuries requirement is central to that purpose.  Villalpando v. Exel Direct, Inc., 
2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 160631 at *34 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 8, 2012) (principal injuries 
requirement ensures that the local controversy exception applies narrowly only to 
“truly local controversies” and embodies an important limit on the scope of the 
local controversy exception).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Google and TeleTech recorded telephone calls 
marketing Google’s AdWords service without the call recipients’ knowledge or 
consent.  He alleges that this conduct injured the call recipients’ right of privacy.  
Even though the phone calls Plaintiff received were part of a nationwide 
telemarketing campaign, he pleads his case only on behalf of other people in 
California, asserting a single claim for violation of California Penal Code section
632.
The district court ruled that by limiting class membership to Californians, 
Plaintiff met his burden to demonstrate that the principal injuries resulting from
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9Defendants’ conduct were confined to California.  Order, doc. 30, p. 8.  The court 
reached its finding despite TeleTech’s introduction of evidence that Plaintiff’s 
phone calls were part of a nationwide telemarketing campaign.  Couturier decl., 
doc. 21 (exhibit 3), ¶¶ 6-7 (AdWords telemarketing campaign extended “across the 
nation and into other countries,” and TeleTech’s recording practices did not differ 
in California compared to rest of nation).
The court was also unmoved by the potential for litigation across the nation, 
despite acknowledging that a “handful” of other states’ call recording laws are 
similar to California Penal Code section 632 in requiring consent or knowledge of 
all parties to the call.  There are at least eleven such states.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-570d (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 934.03 (2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., [CTS. &
JUD. PROC.] § 10-402 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (2013); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. 179.410 et seq. (2013); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 570-A et seq. (2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (2013); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1) (2013).  These eleven other states included some 
72,853,000 Americans at the 2010 census, amounting to nearly double California’s 
population of 37,253,000.  U.S. Census Bureau, “State & County Quickfacts,” 
available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (last visited Jul. 21, 2013).  
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Still, the district court concluded that principal injuries stemming from the 
AdWords campaign were confined to California.
No decision of this Court yet addresses whether a plaintiff can meet the 
principal injuries requirement in an otherwise multistate controversy simply by 
limiting class membership to citizens of a single state.  However, the district
court’s order runs directly counter to a series of decisions of other district courts in 
this circuit.  
For example, in Waller v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
50408 (S.D. Cal., May 10, 2011), plaintiff purported to represent consumers who 
purchased computer hard drives that did not operate as advertised.  Id. at *1.  The 
putative class contained only California citizens.  Id. at *6.  The complaint asserted 
only California causes of action, including violations of California’s Unfair 
Competition Law, Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and False Advertising Act.  Id. 
at *1-*2.  
Nonetheless, the Southern District could not find that the principal injuries 
were “in any meaningful way limited to California,” because the computer hard 
drives in dispute were marketed and sold nationwide.  Waller, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 50408 at *14-*15.  “Plaintiff alleges nothing wrongful about their marketing 
and sale that is peculiar to California, and there is no reason to believe that the 
Defendants aren’t vulnerable to suit on very similar grounds beyond California.  
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That isn’t characteristic of a local dispute.”  Id. at *14.
The Waller court emphatically rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the 
California-only class definition and California-only claims rendered the principal 
injuries purely local in character.  “Plaintiff’s action is local only in the trivial and 
almost tautological sense that the definition of the putative class and the legal bases 
of the asserted claims make it so.”  Waller, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 50408 at *13.  
The court continued, “Courts have routinely looked beyond these formalities -- and 
looked to the nature and scope of the alleged wrong -- and rejected a plaintiff’s 
invocation of the local controversy exception that relies on them.”  Id. 
A judge of the Northern District of California recently concurred with the 
Waller court’s reasoning.  In a class action on behalf of California consumers 
alleging violations of California statutes, Judge Breyer determined that CAFA’s 
local controversy exception could not apply because the defendant’s disputed 
business practices could also “support liability under other states’ consumer 
protection laws.”  Phillips v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 80456 at *18 (N.D. Cal., Jul. 25, 2011).  The Phillips decision excerpted a 
portion of CAFA’s legislative history from a Senate report:  
If the defendants engaged in conduct that could be 
alleged to have injured consumers throughout the country 
or broadly throughout several states, the case would not 
qualify for this [local controversy] exception, even if it 
were brought only as a single-state class action.  In other 
words, this provision looks at where the principal injuries 
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were suffered by everyone who was affected by the 
alleged conduct -- not just where the proposed class 
members were injured.  Id. at *17 (quoting S. Rep. No. 
109-14 at 40-41).
Thus, ruled Judge Breyer, “Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to defeat federal 
jurisdiction by filing essentially national or regional class actions limited to 
plaintiffs from one state.”  Id.; see also Villalpando, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 160631 
at *35-*36 (local controversy exception did not apply to California wage and hour 
claims asserted on behalf of California class, because defendants were “vulnerable 
to similar claims in other states”); Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 41614 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 21, 2005) (principal injuries requirement not met 
despite California-only claims and California-only class because certified pre-
owned vehicle sales program was national in scope and subject to litigation in 
other states; plaintiff’s assertion that principal injuries limited to California “has no 
merit”); Brook v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 73640 
(S.D.N.Y., Sep. 28, 2007) (plaintiff could not satisfy principal injuries requirement 
despite New York-only class definition because “adverse effects suffered, as a 
result of defendants’ culpable conduct” extended to “several other states”).
The district court’s order in this case contravenes this entire line of cases, 
which cannot be distinguished in any meaningful way.  Just as in Waller, Phillips, 
Villalpando, Kearns, and Brook, Plaintiff here complains of an alleged injury 
suffered beyond California.  The AdWords telemarketing campaign was 
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nationwide in scope, such that any invasions of privacy inflicted by allegedly 
improper call recording took place across the nation and could prompt litigation in 
at least eleven other states.  
Because there is nothing about this controversy unique or local to California, 
TeleTech submits that the district court erred in finding that Plaintiff met his 
burden to satisfy the principal injuries requirement.  At the very least, the district 
court’s ruling on the question is fairly debatable and warrants review by this Court.  
Coleman, 627 F.3d at 1100.   
B. The Question Is Consequential to the Case’s Resolution.
Under Coleman, 627 F.3d at 1100, the Court should also consider the 
importance of the CAFA-related question to the case.  The local controversy 
exception is the sole basis of the district court’s remand order.  Order, doc. 30, p. 8.  
The principal injuries requirement is an indispensable element of the local 
controversy exception.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(III).  Accordingly, the CAFA-
related issue presented by this petition is consequential.
C. The District Court’s Ruling Will Otherwise Evade Review And Is 
Final.
The Court should also consider the likelihood that the question will evade 
effective review if left for consideration only after final judgment.  Coleman, 627 
F.3d at 1100.  If this Court does not permit this appeal, the case will proceed to 
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final resolution in California Superior Court.  The dispute over application of the 
local controversy exception to this matter will never be reviewed.
Further, this case presents a suitable and convenient opportunity for 
reviewing the principal injuries issue.  The district court’s remand order is final.  
Coleman, 627 F.3d at 1100 (“whether the record is sufficiently developed and the 
order sufficiently final to permit intelligent review”) (internal quotation omitted).  
After full briefing in the district court, the record is sufficiently developed to 
permit intelligent review, but it is also concise.  The single article of evidence 
pertinent to the principal injuries requirement is the sworn declaration of Rebecca 
Couturier describing the nationwide scope of the Google AdWords telemarketing 
campaign.  Couturier decl., doc. 21 (exhibit 3).
D. The Balance of Harms Is Lopsided In Favor of Permitting This 
Appeal.
Finally, the balance of harms tips decisively toward review of the district 
court’s remand order.  Coleman, 627 F.3d at 1100 (courts should perform the 
“familiar inquiry into the balance of harms”).  
If the Court accepts this appeal, the parties will know fairly soon whether 
this class action rightfully belongs in federal court.  That is because CAFA 
incorporates expedited appellate procedures.  Under 28 U.S.C. section 1453(c)(2), 
this appeal will be taken to judgment within 60 days of the Court’s decision to 
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review the remand order.  Plaintiff would suffer no meaningful harm and would 
lose no substantive rights in the meantime.
On the other hand, without appellate review, TeleTech will be deprived of a 
significant right -- its right to defend this matter in federal court.  TeleTech is a 
Colorado corporation in jeopardy of a multi-million dollar exposure in California 
state court based on allegations surrounding conduct that was national in scope and
potentially actionable in multiple other states.  This is precisely the kind of case 
that Congress intended to be heard in a federal forum.
In all, Plaintiff faces no articulable harm in having to participate in an 
expedited appeal of the district court’s remand order.  By contrast, TeleTech would 
forever lose its right to defend this matter in federal court unless this Court grants 
review. 
VI. CONCLUSION
TeleTech respectfully requests that this Court grant permission for TeleTech 
to perfect an appeal of the district court’s remand order.
Dated:  July 22, 2013 GORDON & REES, L.L.P.
By: /s/ M.D. Scully
M.D. Scully
Allison F. Borts
Attorneys for defendant and 
petitioner 
TELETECH SERVICES 
CORPORATION
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
DAVID F. CALKINS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
GOOGLE, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  13-cv-00760-JST    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
REMAND 
Re: ECF No. 18 
 
 
 In this putative class action for state-law claims arising out of the unauthorized recording 
of telemarking calls, Plaintiff Calkins moves to remand the action to the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County.  As the motion is suitable for determination without oral argument, the hearing 
scheduled for June 27, 2013, is VACATED.  For the reasons set forth below, the motion is 
GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff David Calkins brings this action against Defendants Google and TeleTech 
Services on his own behalf and on behalf of “[a]ll persons in California” whose telephone 
conversations with persons calling on behalf of Google were recorded without their authorization.   
First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 1, Ex. B.  Google hired TeleTech to make the calls on 
its behalf regarding its AdWords service.  Id. ¶ 8.   
 Calkins alleges that three days after he registered for Google’s AdWords service, he 
received two separate phone calls from TeleTech customer service representatives to discuss the 
service.  Id. ¶ 6.  Calkins had no reason to believe the calls were being recorded and never 
consented to the recording of the calls.  Id.  Yet, at the end of the second call, a customer service 
representative told Calkins that all telephone conversations with representatives “who call on 
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behalf of Google are recorded.”  Id.   
Calkins claims that Google and Teletech violated California Penal Code Section 632 by 
recording the telephone calls that Teletech made on Google’s behalf with respect to the AdWords 
service.
1
  Id. ¶¶ 14-20.  In the complaint, Calkins alleges that the class has at least 500 members 
and that every person who had a conversation recorded in violation of Section 632 is entitled to 
statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 per call.  Calkins, however, does not allege the total 
amount of damages he seeks on behalf of the putative class. 
TeleTech removed the action from the Superior Court of Santa Clara County on February 
20, 2013, under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).  ECF No. 1.   
Calkins moves to remand the action on the grounds that TeleTech has not met its burden to 
show that removal under CAFA was proper.  In the alternative, Calkins argues that, even if 
removal under CAFA was proper, the Court must remand the action under CAFA’s local 
controversy exception.  ECF No. 18.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“A civil action in state court may be removed to federal district court if the district court 
had ‘original jurisdiction’ over the matter.”  Lowdermilk v. United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 
F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).  “[R]emoval statutes are strictly 
construed against removal.”  Luther v. Countrywide Homes Loans Serv., LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 
(9th Cir. 2008).  “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 
removal in the first instance.”  Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).  The burden 
of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists is on the party seeking removal.  Id. at 566-67. 
III. DISCUSSION 
   As amended by CAFA, “28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) vests district courts with original jurisdiction 
of any civil action in which, inter alia, the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and in which the aggregate number of proposed 
                                                 
1
 California Penal Code Section 632 makes it a crime for a party to a telephone call to record the 
conversation without disclosing the recording to the other party if the other party has an 
objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation will not be recorded and is confidential. 
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plaintiffs is 100 or greater, and any member of the plaintiff class is a citizen of a state different 
from any defendant.”  Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 997 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[U]nder CAFA the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction 
remains . . . on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.”  Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 
443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). 
Calkins moves to remand this action on the basis that TeleTech failed to meet its burden to 
establish that removal under CAFA was proper.  Specifically, Calkins argues that TeleTech has 
failed to show that (1) the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million; and (2) the notice of removal 
was timely.   The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn. 
A. Amount in Controversy 
In the context of removal jurisdiction under CAFA, “[w]here the complaint does not 
specify the amount of damages sought, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.”  Id. at 683 (citation 
omitted).  
Here, the complaint does not specify the amount of damages that Calkins seeks on behalf 
of the putative class.  Instead, the complaint alleges merely that “every person who had one or 
more of their confidential telephone conversations with Defendants recorded without their consent 
is entitled to statutory damages in the amount of $5,000” and that the putative class contains “not 
less” than 500 individuals.  FAC ¶¶ 3, 12.  Accordingly, TeleTech, the party seeking removal 
under CAFA, must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is 
at least $5 million. 
In the notice of removal, Teletech states that it recorded at least 1,000 phone calls on 
behalf of Google in California during the class period, which ranges from February 24, 2009, to 
February 20, 2013.  Not. of Removal at 2; see also Kirchgessner Decl. ¶ 4.  Teletech contends that 
this action satisfies CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement because there are more than 
1,000 calls in controversy and each of those calls could result in damages of $5,000, for a total that 
exceeds $5 million. 
Calkins argues that Teletech’s showing does not satisfy its burden of proof with respect to 
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the amount in controversy, because Teletech’s showing pertains to each of the calls that it 
recorded, whereas only a subset of those calls are at issue in this action, namely the calls that it 
recorded without authorization.  In other words, Calkins argues that TeleTech cannot satisfy its 
burden of proof unless it submits evidence showing that it recorded 1,000 or more phone 
conversations without authorization. 
A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit is helpful in evaluating whether TeleTech’s 
allegations are sufficient to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement under CAFA.  In Lewis 
v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 627 F.3d 395 (9th Cir. 2010), the plaintiffs claimed that Verizon 
billed them for a premium service they never ordered.  Id. at 399.  Verizon removed the action to 
federal court.  In support of its notice of removal, Verizon filed a declaration stating that its total 
billings for the premium service at issue was greater than $5 million in California.  Id. at 400.  The 
district court remanded the case, holding that a showing of Verizon’s total billings could not 
establish CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement because the plaintiffs were seeking 
compensation only for unauthorized billings, and not for all billings.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court, holding that Verizon’s showing established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million dollars: 
 
The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount 
in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.  To 
establish the jurisdictional amount, Verizon need not concede 
liability for the entire amount, which is what the district court was in 
essence demanding by effectively asking Verizon to admit that at 
least $5 million of the billings were ‘unauthorized’ within the 
meaning of the complaint. 
Id. at 400 (internal citation omitted). 
In light of Lewis, the Court concludes that Teletech has satisfied its burden to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $5 million.  
TeleTech need not concede that it recorded at least 1,000 confidential phone calls without 
authorization.  It is sufficient that it has admitted to recording over 1,000 phone calls in California, 
as this establishes that its potential liability exceeds $5 million.  Accordingly, Calkins’ motion to 
remand for failure to satisfy CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement must be denied. 
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B. Timeliness 
  A party seeking removal must file a notice of removal within 30 days after receiving the 
initial pleading.  See 28 U.S.C § 1446(b)(1).  Alternatively, if the ground for removal is not 
apparent in the initial complaint, a party seeking removal must file a notice of removal within 30 
days of receiving “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.”  See 28 U.S.C § 1446(b)(3). 
Calkins argues that TeleTech’s notice of removal was not timely for two reasons, neither 
of which is persuasive.   
First, Calkins argues that the 30-day period for removal under Section 1446(b)(1) began to 
run when Teletech was served with the FAC even though that pleading did not state the amount in 
controversy.  Calkins argues that the notice of removal was therefore untimely, because Teletech 
did not remove within this 30-day window.  For the 30-day period under Section 1446(b)(1) to 
begin, “the ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading.”  Harris v. 
Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005).  Here, the FAC is devoid of any 
allegation showing that the amount in controversy exceeds CAFA’s $5 million threshold or that 
the number of purported violations of Section 632 is greater than 1,000.  Because the ground for 
removal under CAFA was not revealed affirmatively in the FAC, the 30-day window under 
Section 1446(b)(1) never began to run.  Accordingly, the notice of removal was not untimely on 
this basis. 
 Second, Calkins argues that the 30-day period for removal under Section 1446(b)(3) began 
to run “as soon as Teletech became aware of this lawsuit” because, at that time, it had “possession 
of reports that indicated the number of . . . disputed calls.”  Mot. at 7 (internal citations omitted).  
Calkins contends that these reports are “other paper” under Section 1446(b)(3) that would have 
allowed TeleTech to determine that it had recorded more than 1,000 calls and, therefore, that this 
case was removable.   
Though the Ninth Circuit has not defined the scope of the term “other paper” within the 
meaning of Section 1446(b)(3) or addressed the question of whether a defendant can receive 
“other paper” from itself, the plain language of the statute is clear that “other paper” refers to a 
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document received from another person or party in connection with the litigation.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1446(b)(3) (statute begins to run only “after receipt by the defendant, through service or 
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first 
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable”).  Here, TeleTech never 
“received” the reports at issue, because they were within TeleTech’s possession at all times, and 
would have been so regardless of this litigation.  TeleTech’s possession does not constitute the 
type of “receipt” contemplated by Section 1446(b)(3).   
Extending the meaning of “receipt” to cover documents that were never transferred to 
TeleTech would also require the Court to inquire into TeleTech’s subjective knowledge to 
determine the time at which it first became aware of such documents and the grounds for 
removability; such an inquiry is disfavored by the Ninth Circuit: 
 
[W]e will not require courts to inquire into the subjective knowledge 
of the defendant, an inquiry that could degenerate into a mini-trial 
regarding who knew what and when.  Rather, we will allow the 
court to rely on the face of the initial pleading and on the documents 
exchanged in the case by the parties to determine when the 
defendant had notice of the grounds for removal, requiring that those 
grounds be apparent within the four corners of the initial pleading or 
subsequent paper.  
Harris, 425 F.3d at 695 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Because the reports at issue are not “other papers” and thus never triggered the 30-day 
period under Section 1446(b)(3), Teletech’s notice of removal was not untimely under Section 
1446(b)(3). 
Accordingly, Calkins’ motion to remand on the basis that removal was untimely must be 
denied. 
C. Local Controversy 
Calkins argues that, even if removal under CAFA was proper, the Court must nevertheless 
remand this action because it falls within CAFA’s “local controversy” exception.    
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A), a court “shall decline” jurisdiction of a class action 
properly removed to federal court under CAFA if:  
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(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff 
classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action 
was originally filed;  
(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant—  
(a) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the 
plaintiff class;  
(b) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the 
claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and  
(c) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was 
originally filed; and  
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any 
related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in 
which the action was originally filed. 
The party seeking to remand under CAFA’s local controversy exception bears the burden 
of proving the applicability of the exception.  Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1024 
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “although the removing party bears the initial burden of establishing 
federal jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2), once federal jurisdiction has been established under that 
provision, the objecting party bears the burden of proof as to the applicability of any express 
statutory exception under §§ 1332(d)(4)(A) and (B)”).   
Here, Calkins has met his burden to show that this action falls within CAFA’s “local 
controversy” exception.  Accordingly, Calkins’ motion to remand on this basis is GRANTED. 
First, Calkins has shown that more than two-thirds of the proposed class members likely 
are California citizens.  The class definition in the complaint includes “[a]ll persons in 
California . . . who . . . spoke on the telephone with a customer service representative who called 
on behalf of Google and were not advised . . . that it was being or might be recorded.”  FAC ¶ 11.  
While it is possible that not every person who TeleTech called in California actually is domiciled 
in California, it is at least probable that more than two-thirds of the individuals who were called in 
California are domiciled there.   
Second, Calkins has shown that at least one defendant whose conduct forms a significant 
basis for the claims asserted, and from whom significant relief is sought, is a citizen of California.  
No party disputes that Google is a citizen of California.  Though TeleTech argues that Google’s 
conduct was not sufficiently significant to form the basis of Calkins’ claims, the Court disagrees.  
Calkins alleges that Google hired TeleTech to make the calls at issue on its behalf.  See FAC ¶¶ 1, 
8.  But for Google, the calls at issue would not have been made.  The allegations in the complaint 
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raise the inference that Google exerted control over TeleTech with respect to the calls at issue, 
which is sufficient to establish that Google’s conduct was sufficiently significant to form the basis 
of Calkins’ claims.  Moreover, Calkins alleges that TeleTech acted merely as Google’s agent.  
This is enough to show that Calkins seeks significant relief from Google. 
 Third, Calkins has shown that the principal injuries at issue occurred in California, as the 
class definition includes only individuals who received calls “in California.”  FAC ¶ 11.  
TeleTech argues that this action is not “local” because it made the calls at issue as part of a 
nationwide marketing campaign, and thus, TeleTech could face liability in other states.   The 
Court is not persuaded by this argument.   
 “CAFA was enacted, in part, to restore the intent of the framers of the United States 
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance under diversity jurisdiction.”  Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 
F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Cases of national 
importance are ones in which the plaintiff alleges conduct that could have created actionable 
controversies in many states under the same legal theory; in these cases, courts retain jurisdiction 
under CAFA on the ground that the cases do not present controversies that are truly local.   See, 
e.g., Phillips v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., C 11-cv-02326 CRB, 2011 WL 3047475, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal., July 25, 2011) (holding that a case involving claims arising out of California’s 
consumer protection laws is not “local” because “the same [legal] theory would support liability 
under other states’ consumer protection laws as well”).   
This action does not present questions of national importance.  While claims brought under 
one state’s consumer protection laws, like the ones in Phillips, may be actionable under the 
consumer protection laws of other states, claims for the unlawful recordation of telephone calls 
under California Penal Code Section 632, like the ones here, are not similarly actionable 
nationwide.  That is because only a “handful” of states have statues similar to Section 632.  Reply 
at 5.  For this reason, even if TeleTech made nationwide calls on Google’s behalf, the Court 
concludes that the principal injuries in this case were suffered in California.   
// 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Calkins’ motion to remand on the basis that this action falls within CAFA’s “local 
controversy” exception is GRANTED.  The Clerk shall mail a copy of this order to the Superior 
Court of Santa Clara County and terminate this action. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: July 12, 2013  
______________________________________ 
JON S. TIGAR 
United States District Judge 
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2/27/2013) (Entered: 02/27/2013)
02/28/20 13 8 ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION CONCERNING TIME TO RESPOND
TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT by Judge Paul S. Grewal, granting .
(ofr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/28/2013) (Entered: 03/01/2013)
03/07/20 13 9 CLERK’S NOTICE ADVANCING TIME ON 3/19/20 13 CASE
MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE: 3/19/2013 2:00 PM Case Management
Conference advanced to 10:00 AM in Courtroom 5, 4th Floor, San Jose before
Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal. ***This is a text only docket entry, there
is no document associated with this notice.*** (ofr, COURT STAFF) (Filed
on 3/7/2013) (Entered: 03/07/20 13)
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03/12/2013 10 CONSENT/DECLINATION to Proceed Before a US Magistrate Judge by
David F. Calkins. (Attachments: # I. Request to Make Telephonic
Appearance , # 2 (Proposed) Order )(Karasik, Gregory) (Filed on 3/12/20 13)
Modified on 3/12/2013 (tsh, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 03/12/2013)
03/12/20 13 II CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT filed by David F. Calkins. (Karasik,
Gregory) (Filed on 3/12/2013) (Entered: 03/12/2013)
03/12/2013 j Certificate of Interested Entities by Google, Inc. Defendant Google Inc.s
Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 7.1 Disclosure Statement and Civil Local Rule
3-16 CertUication ofInterested Entities or Persons (Somvichian, Whitty)
(Filed on 3/12/2013) (Entered:_03/12/2013)
03/12/2013 II CONSENT/DECLINATION to Proceed Before a US Magistrate Judge by
Google, Inc... (Somvichian, Whitty) (Filed on 3/12/2013) (Entered:
03/12/2013)
03/12/20 13 II CLERKS NOTICE of Impending Reassignment to U.S. District Judge: All
matters presently set before Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal are hereby
vacated. Clerk to reassign case. (ofr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/12/20 13)
(Entered: 03/12/20 13)
03/12/2013 j CONSENT/DECLINATION to Proceed Before a US Magistrate Judge by
Teletech Services Corporation.. (Lewis, Justin) (Filed on 3/12/2013) (Entered:
03/12/2013)
03/13/20 13 jj ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar for all
further proceedings. Magistrate Judge Paul Singh Grewal no longer assigned to
the case.Signed by The Executive Committee on 3/13/2013. (tsh, COURT
STAFF) (Filed on 3/13/2013) (Entered: 03/13/2013)
03/14/20 13 17 CLERKS NOTICE SETTING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. Case
Management Statement due by 5/29/2013. Initial Case Management
Conference set for 6/5/2013 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San
Francisco. (Attachments: # ] Standing Order, # 2 Standing Order for All
Judges of the Northern District) (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/14/20 13)
(Entered: 03/14/20 13)
03/1 5/20 13 18 NOTICE OF MOTION & MOTION for Remand; Memorandum of Points &
Authorities filed by David F. Calkins. Motion Hearing set for 5/2/20 13 02:00
PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco before Hon. Jon S. Tigar.
Responses due by 4/4/2013. Replies due by 4/1 1/2013. (Attachments: #(1)
Declaration Declaration of Gregory N. Karasik, #(2) Supplement Notice of
Manual Filing Of Document Under Seal)(Karasik, Gregory) (Filed on
3/15/2013) (Entered: 03/15/2013)
03/15/2013 Correction to deadlines as to MOTION to Remand. Responses due by
3/29/2013. Replies due by 4/5/2013. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on
3/15/2013) (Entered: 03/15/2013)
03/27/20 13 j STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER Concerning Briefing Schedule
on Motion to Remand filed by Teletech Services Corporation & David F.
Calkins. (Attachments: #(1) [Proposed] Order)(Lewis, Justin) (Filed on
https ://ecf,cand.uscourts.gov/cgi-binlDktRpt.pl?339644811043 682-L_1 _0- 1 7/21/2013
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3/27/20 13) (Entered: 03/27/20 13)
03/31/2013 20 ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED BRIEFING SCHEDULE re 19:
Oppositions to re 18 may be filed no later than 4/5/13, and a reply may be filed
no later than 4/12/13. Signed by District Judge Jon 5, Tigar. (This is a text
only docket entry) G stlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/31/2013) (Entered:
03/31/2013)
04/05/2013 21 Memorandum of Points & Authorities in RESPONSE to (re 18 MOTION to
Remand) filed by Teletech Services Corporation. (Attachments: #(1)
Declaration, #(2) Declaration, #(3) Declaration)(Lewis, Justin) (Filed on
4/5/2013) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
04/1 1/20 13 22 ORDER REGARDING “NOTICE OF MANUAL FILING” OF
DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL re jj MOTION to Remand filed by David
F. Calkins. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on April 11, 2013. (wsn, COURT
STAFF) (Filed on 4/11/2013) (Entered: 04/11/2013)
04/1 1/20 13 23 CLERK’S NOTICE Continuing Motion Hearing as to re MOTION to
Remand. Motion Hearing previously set for 5/2/20 13 is continued to 6/27/2013
at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9, 19th Floor, San Francisco before Hon. Jon S.
Tigar. This is a text only entry. There is no document associated with this
notice. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/1 1/20 13) (Entered: 04/11/2013)
04/12/2013 24 REPLY Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of(re jj MOTION
to Remand) filed by David F. Calkins. (Karasik, Gregory) (Filed on 4/12/20 13)
(Entered: 04/12/20 13)
05/16/20 13 NOTICE of Appearance by Allison Feldman Borts M D. Scully and Justin D.
Lewis for Google, Inc. and Teletech Services Corporation (Borts, Allison)
(Filed on 5/16/20 13) (Entered: 05/16/20 13)
05/24/20 13 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED) ORDER RE CONTINUANCE OF
CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE PENDING MOTION FOR REMAND
filed by David F. Calkins, Google Inc., Teletech Services Corporation.
(Karasik, Gregory) (Filed on 5/24/20 13) (Entered: 05/24/2013)
05/28/20 13 27 STIPULATION AND ORDER re 26 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED
ORDER RE CONTINUANCE OF CASE MANAGEMENT
CONFERENCE PENDING MOTION FOR REMAND filed by David F.
Calkins. Case Management Statement due by 7/24/2013. Initial Case
Management Conference set for 7/31/2013 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 9,
19th Floor, San Francisco. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on May 28, 2013.
(wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/28/2013) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
06/1 8/20 13 28 STIPULATION WITH [PROPOSED] ORDER to Continue Hearing of re
MOTION to Remand filed by Google, Inc., Teletech Services Corporation.
(Attachments: # I Proposed Order)(Lewis, Justin) (Filed on 6/1 8/20 13)
(Entered: 06/18/2013)
06/18/2013 29 ORDER VACATING HEARING AND DENYING STIPULATED
REQUEST AS MOOT re 18 MOTION to Remand filed by David F.
Calkins; denying as moot re 28 STIPULATION WITH PROPOSED
https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cgi-binlDktRpt.pl?3 39644811043 682-L_1_0- 1 7/21/2013
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ORDER. Signed by Judge Jon S. Tigar on June 18, 2013. (wsn, COURT
STAFF) (Filed on 6/18/2013) (Entered: 06/18/2013)
07/12/2013 30 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REMAND by Judge Jon S. Tigar;
granting re 18 Motion to Remand. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on
7/12/2013) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
07/15/2013 31 Certified copy of remand order and Certified copy of docket entries mailed to
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Clara. (tn,
COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/15/2013) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I am an employee of Gordon & Rees, L.L.P., counsel for defendant and 
petitioner TeleTech Services Corporation in this matter.  I hereby certify that on 
July 22, 2013, I made service of the accompanying petition and related papers by 
arranging for delivery by a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within three 
days to plaintiff and respondent David F. Calkins at the office of his attorney, as 
set forth below:
Gregory N. Karasik, Esq.
Karasik Law Firm
11835 W. Olympic Blvd., suite 1275
Los Angeles, California  90064
Additionally, on July 22, 2013, I sent an electronic copy of the petition and 
related papers to Mr. Karasik at greg@karasiklawfirm.com.  
Defendant Google, Inc., is represented in this matter by this office, and, as 
such, no service on Google, Inc., is required.
Dated:  July 22, 2013 /s/ Justin D. Lewis
Justin D. Lewis
Case: 13-80166     07/22/2013          ID: 8713935     DktEntry: 1-2     Page: 36 of 36
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the NINTH CIRCUIT
Office of the Clerk
After Opening a Case – Counseled Cases
(revised March 2013)
Court Address – San Francisco Headquarters
Mailing Address for 
U.S. Postal Service
Mailing Address for
Overnight Delivery
(FedEx, UPS, etc.)
Street Address
Office of the Clerk
James R. Browning
Courthouse
U.S. Court of Appeals
P.O.  Box 193939
San Francisco, CA
94119-3939
Office of the Clerk
James R. Browning
Courthouse
U.S. Court of Appeals
95 Seventh Street
San Francisco, CA
94103-1526
95 Seventh Street
San Francisco, CA 
94103
Court Addresses – Divisional Courthouses
Pasadena Portland Seattle
Richard H. Chambers
Courthouse
125 South Grand Avenue
Pasadena, CA 91105
Pioneer Courthouse
700 SW 6th Ave, Ste 110
Portland, OR 97204
William K. Nakamura
Courthouse
1010 Fifth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104
Court Website – www.ca9.uscourts.gov
The Court’s website contains the Court’s Rules and General Orders, information
about electronic filing of documents, answers to frequently asked questions,
directions to the courthouses, forms necessary to gain admission to the bar of the
Court, opinions and memoranda, recordings of oral arguments, links to practice
manuals, and an invitation to join our Pro Bono Program.
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Court Phone List
Main Phone Number. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8000 
Attorney Admissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7800
Calendar Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8190
CJA Matters (Operations Unit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7920
Docketing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7840
Death Penalty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8197
Electronic Filing – Appellate ECF.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Send email to
cmecf_ca9help@ca9.uscourts.gov
Library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8650
Mediation Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7900
Motions Attorney Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-8020
Procedural Motions Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7860
Records Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (415) 355-7820
Divisional Court Offices:
Pasadena. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (626) 229-7250
Portland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (503) 833-5300
Seattle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (206) 224-2200
Electronic Case Filing
The Ninth Circuit’s Appellate ECF (Electronic Case Files) system is mandatory for
all attorneys filing in the Court, unless they are granted an exemption.  All
non-exempted attorneys who appear in an ongoing case are required to register for
and to use the Appellate ECF system.  Registration and information about ECF is
available on the Court’s website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Electronic
Filing–ECF.  Read the Circuit Rules, especially Ninth Circuit Rule 25-5, for
guidance on Appellate ECF, including which documents can and cannot be filed
electronically.
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Rules of Practice
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (Fed. R. App. P.), the Ninth Circuit
Rules (9th Cir. R.) and the General Orders govern practice before this Court.  The
rules are available on the Court’s website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Rules.
Practice Resources
The Court has prepared a practice guide video entitled Perfecting Your Appeal. 
The video may be viewed for free on the Court’s website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov
under FAQs, Forms and Instructions -> Guides and Legal Outlines, and may be
purchased through the Clerk’s office in San Francisco for $15.00.  Continuing
legal education credit for viewing this videotape is available in most jurisdictions.  
Admission to the Bar of the Ninth Circuit 
All attorneys practicing before the Court must be admitted to the Bar of the Ninth
Circuit.  Fed. R. App. P. 46(a); 9th Cir. R. 46-1.1 & 46-1.2.
To apply for admission, obtain an application on the Court’s website at
www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms or by calling (415) 355-7800. If you are
registered for the 9th Circuit's Appellate ECF system, upload your application and
pay the $230.00 fee with a credit card by logging into Appellate ECF and clicking
on Utilities > Attorney Admission.  Otherwise, mail the application to the Clerk’s
Office in San Francisco with the admission fee of $230.00.  Your check or money
order must be included with the application. 
Notice of Change of Address
Counsel who are registered for Appellate ECF must update their personal
information, including street addresses and/or email addresses, online at:
https://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/psco/cgi-bin/cmecf/ea-login.pl  9th Cir. R. 46-3.
Counsel who have been granted an exemption from using Appellate ECF must file
a written change of address with the Court.  9th Cir. R. 46-3.
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Motions Practice
Following are some of the basic points of motion practice, governed by Fed. R.
App. P. 27 and 9th Cir. R. 27-1 through 27-13.
• Neither a notice of motion nor a proposed order is required.  Fed. R. App. P.
27(a)(2)(C)(ii), (iii).  
• Motions may be supported by an affidavit or declaration.  28 U.S.C. § 1746.
• Each motion should provide the position of the opposing party.  Circuit
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 27-1(5); 9th Cir. R. 31-2.2(b)(6).  
• A response to a motion is due 10 days from the service of the motion.  Fed. R.
App. P. 27(a)(3)(A).  The reply is due 7 days from service of the response.  Fed.
R. App. P. 27(a)(4); Fed. R. App. P. 26(c).  
• A response requesting affirmative relief and/or relief by a date certain must
include that request in the caption.  Fed. R. App. P. 27(a)(3)(B).
• A motion filed after a case has been scheduled for oral argument, has been
argued, is under submission or has been decided by a panel, must include on the
initial page and/or cover the date of argument, submission or decision and, if
known, the names of the judges on the panel.  9th Cir. R. 25-4.
Emergency or Urgent Motions
All emergency and urgent motions must conform with the provisions of 9th Cir. R.
27-3.  Note that a motion requesting procedural relief (e.g., an extension of time to
file a brief) is not the type of matter contemplated by 9th Cir. R. 27-3.  Circuit
Advisory Committee Note to 27-3(3).
Prior to filing an emergency motion, the moving party must contact an attorney in
the Motions Unit in San Francisco at (415) 355-8020.  
When it is absolutely necessary to notify the Court of an emergency outside of
standard office hours, the moving party shall call (415) 355-8000.  Keep in mind
that this line is for true emergencies that cannot wait until the next business day
(e.g., an imminent execution or removal from the United States).  
Briefing Schedule
The Court issues the briefing schedule at the time the appeal is docketed.
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Certain motions (e.g., a motion for dismissal) automatically stay the briefing
schedule.  9th Cir. R. 27-11.
The opening and answering brief due dates (and any other deadline set for a
date certain by the Court) are not subject to the additional time described in Fed. R.
App. P. 26(c).  The early filing of appellant’s opening brief does not advance the
due date for appellee’s answering brief.  9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.
Extensions of Time to file a Brief
Streamlined Request
If you have not yet asked for any extension of time to file the brief, you may request
one streamlined extension of up to 30 days from the brief’s existing due date. 
Submit your request via the Appellate ECF system using the “File a Streamlined
Request to Extend Time to File Brief” event on or before your brief’s existing due
date.  No form or written motion is required.
Written Extension 
Requests for extensions of more than 30 days will be granted only upon a written
motion supported by a showing of diligence and substantial need.  This motion
shall be filed at least 7 days before the due date for the brief.  The motion shall be
accompanied by an affidavit or declaration that includes all of the information
listed at 9th Cir. R. 31-2.2(b).  
The Court will ordinarily adjust the schedule in response to an initial motion. 
Circuit Advisory Committee Note to Rule 31-2.2.  The Court expects that the brief
will be filed within the requested period of time.  Id.  
Contents of Briefs
The required components of a brief are set out at Fed. R. App. P. 28 and 32, and
9th Cir. R. 28-2, 32-1 and 32-2.
Excerpts of Record
The Court requires Excerpts of Record rather than an Appendix.  9th Cir. R. 30-
1.1(a).  Please review 9th Cir. R. 30-1.3 through 30-1.6 to see a list of the specific
contents and format.  For Excerpts that exceed 75 pages, the first volume must
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comply with 9th Cir. R. 30-1.6(a).  Excerpts exceeding 300 pages must be filed in
multiple volumes.  9th Cir. R. 30-1.6(b).
Appellee may file supplemental Excerpts and appellant may file further Excerpts. 
9th Cir. R. 30-1.7 and 30-1.8.  If you are an appellee responding to a pro se brief
that did not come with Excerpts, then your Excerpts need only include the contents
set out at 9th Cir. R. 30-1.7.
 
Excerpts must be submitted in PDF format on Appellate ECF on the same day the
filer submits the brief, unless the Excerpts contain sealed materials.  If the Excerpts
contain sealed materials, please electronically submit only the unsealed volumes. 
The filer shall serve a paper copy of the Excerpts on any party not registered for
Appellate ECF.
After electronic submission, the Court will direct the filer to file 4
separately-bound excerpts of record with white covers in paper copy.
Mediation Program 
Mediation Questionnaires are required in all civil cases except cases in which the
appellant is proceeding pro se, habeas cases (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 and 2255)
and petitions for writs (28 U.S.C. § 1651).  9th Cir. R. 3-4.  They are not required
in criminal cases.
The Mediation Questionnaire is available on the Court’s website at
www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms.  The Mediation Questionnaire should be filed
within 7 days of the docketing of a civil appeal.  The Mediation Questionnaire is
used only to assess settlement potential.
If you are interested in requesting a conference with a mediator, you may call the
Mediation Unit at (415) 355-7900, email ca09_mediation@ca9.uscourts.gov or
make a written request to the Chief Circuit Mediator.  You may request
conferences confidentially.  More information about the Court’s mediation
program is available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/mediation.
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Oral Hearings
Notices of the oral hearing calendars are distributed approximately 4 to 5 weeks
before the hearing date. 
The Court will change the date or location of an oral hearing only for good cause,
and requests to continue a hearing filed within 14 days of the hearing will be
granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.  9th Cir. R. 34-2.
Oral hearing will be conducted in all cases unless all members of the panel agree
that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.  Fed.
R. App. P. 34.
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Ninth Circuit Appellate Lawyer Representatives
APPELLATE MENTORING PROGRAM
1. Purpose
The Appellate Mentoring Program is intended to provide mentoring on a
voluntary basis to attorneys who are new to federal appellate practice or would
benefit from guidance at the appellate level.  In addition to general assistance
regarding federal appellate practice, the project will provide special focus on two
substantive areas of practice - immigration law and habeas corpus petitions. 
Mentors will be volunteers who have experience in immigration, habeas corpus,
and/or appellate practice in general.  The project is limited to counseled cases. 
2. Coordination, recruitment of volunteer attorneys, disseminating information
about the program, and requests for mentoring 
Current or former Appellate Lawyer Representatives (ALRs) will serve as
coordinators for the Appellate Mentoring Program.  The coordinators will recruit
volunteer attorneys with appellate expertise, particularly in the project's areas of
focus, and will maintain a list of those volunteers.  The coordinators will ask the
volunteer attorneys to describe their particular strengths in terms of mentoring
experience, substantive expertise, and appellate experience, and will maintain a
record of this information as well. 
The Court will include information about the Appellate Mentoring Program
in the case opening materials sent to counsel and will post information about it on
the Court's website.  Where appropriate in specific cases, the Court may also
suggest that counsel seek mentoring on a voluntary basis.
Counsel who desire mentoring should contact the court at
mentoring@ca9.uscourts.gov, and staff will notify the program coordinators. The
coordinators will match the counsel seeking mentoring with a mentor, taking into
account the mentor's particular strengths. 
3. The mentoring process 
The extent of the mentor's guidance may vary depending on the nature of the case,
the mentee's needs, and the mentor's availability.  In general, the mentee should
initiate contact with the mentor, and the mentee and mentor should determine
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together how best to proceed.  For example, the areas of guidance may range from
basic questions about the mechanics of perfecting an appeal to more sophisticated
matters such as effective research, how to access available resources, identification
of issues, strategy, appellate motion practice, and feedback on writing.     
4. Responsibility/liability statement
The mentee is solely responsible for handling the appeal and any other
aspects of the client's case, including all decisions on whether to present an issue,
how to present it in briefing and at oral argument, and how to counsel the client. 
By participating in the program, the mentee agrees that the mentor shall not be
liable for any suggestions made. In all events, the mentee is deemed to waive and
is estopped from asserting any claim for legal malpractice against the mentor.  
The mentor's role is to provide guidance and feedback to the mentee.  The
mentor will not enter an appearance in the case and is not responsible for handling
the case, including determining which issues to raise and how to present them and
ensuring that the client is notified of proceedings in the case and receives
appropriate counsel.  The mentor accepts no professional liability for any advice
given. 
5. Confidentiality statement
The mentee alone will have contact with the client, and the mentee must
maintain client confidences, as appropriate, with respect to non-public information. 
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